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This paper explores the Neoplatonic interpretations of the distinction that Plato 
draws at the beginning of Timaeus (27d6 – 28a1) between “that which always is 
and has no becoming” and “that which is always becoming but never is”. Phi-
loponus tries to show that Plato understands “generated” in the sense of “generated 
in time”, rejecting Aristotle’s incompatible thesis. According to the Neoplatonic 
reading that Plotinus inaugurates, and Porphyry subsequently develops, “genera-
ted” (γενητóν) has two meanings: to depend on a cause and to exist by virtue of 
a composition. The first meaning is assigned to the incorporeal – the Intelligence 
and the Soul; the two meanings, on the other hand, are assigned to bodies. The 
Intelligence depends on a cause, the One-Good; and, in turn, the Soul depends 
on a cause, the Intelligence. These realities are not in the range of “that which is 
always generated and never is”, but of “that which always is and is not genera-
ted”, i.e. of “that which is without ceasing to be”. 
Keywords:  Plato – Timaeus – Neoplatonism –  Becoming – Generated –  Cosmology 
The distinction that Plato establishes in Timaeus (27d6 – 28a1) between “that which 
always is and has no becoming (τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον)” and “that which is 
always becoming but never is (τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε)”2 raises the 
hypothetical alternative between the two possible models that the craftsman has before 
him to manufacture his work. But then the alternative is clarified: if one generated is 
chosen as the model, the result will never be beautiful, while if the eternal model is 
chosen, the work will be beautiful (28a – b). That said, “that which is generated and 
destroyed” in some way is (Resp. V.477e – 478d), although it never truly becomes 
(Tim. 28a).  
The changes involved in the notion of becoming – generation and corruption – 
require the principle of causality to be used: Everything that is generated necessarily has 
a cause – this being understood in the sense of artisanal cause – and since the world is 
 
1 I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their invaluable comments and recommendations. 
2 Although the handwritten tradition remains very uncertain about it, and despite the controversy 
that has developed in recent years, we maintain, with Rivaud (1925, 140), the second ἀεί, the one 
that follows τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν. See Brisson, in Zamora Calvo (2010, 383, n. 96). 
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beautiful, the divine artisan or demiurge has produced it by looking at the eternal model, 
which is always identical, and not the generated model. The difference between the dis-
courses referring to the eternal model and those referring to the copy of that model, that 
is to say, to the world, allows the following proportion to be established:  
be : becoming : truth : belief 
For Plato, becoming, that which is always generated, differs from the world for 
four reasons: (1) When Timaeus offers us a summary of the introduction of a “third 
genre”, he affirms that are “being (ὄν), space (χώραν), and becoming (γένεσιν), three 
distinct things which existed even before the heavens came to be (καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν 
γενέσθαι)” (Tim. 52d3 – 4; trans. Zeyl 1997, 1255, slightly modified). (2) At the beginning 
of his cosmogonic discourse, becoming is postulated as a hypothetical model for the 
generation of the world, even if it is a disregarded hypothesis (27d – 28a). (3) Becom-
ing is “both visible and tangible and it has a body (ὁρατὸς γὰρ ἁπτός τέ ἐστιν καὶ 
σῶμα ἔχων)” (28b7 – 8; see 31b), while the world is not only corporeal, but also a liv-
ing being that consists of a body and also a soul. (4) The demiurge “so he took over 
all that was visible (πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν) – not at rest but in discordant and disorderly 
motion – and brought it from a state of disorder to one of order (εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν 
ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας), because he believed that order was in every way better (ἄμεινον) than 
disorder” (30a3 – 6; trans. Zeyl 1997, 1236). Therefore, by virtue of these four rea-
sons, becoming, which by itself signifies disorder, differs from the world. Since what 
is generated, while not truly, is an object of opinion and is not intelligible, then cau-
sality is confined to the sensible. 
In Timaeus, Plato distinguishes between two modes of apprehension, based on 
the radical ontological heterogeneity between being and becoming (27d5 – 28a4): (1) 
That which is born and perishes, that which always becomes another, can only be the 
object of sensible perception and of the opinion that comes from it; (2) that which 
always is and remains identical to itself, conversely, can only be grasped by intellec-
tion (νόησις). Since nature and the universe belong to the order of becoming, to which 
it never remains identical to itself but always changes, it is impossible for them to be 
the object of science. Therefore, by always becoming others, nature and the universe 
never are, because they do not belong to the order of what is. 
I.  
In On the Eternity of the World against Proclus (De aeternitate mundi contra Pro-
clum), John Philoponus no longer defends the thesis of a doctrinal symphony between 
Plato and Aristotle, but argues that between both philosophers the disagreement pre-
vails in the capital points. A part of this mature treatise – written around 529 – is 
precisely dedicated to a new key project in the development of his hermeneutical ar-
chitecture: it seeks to snatch the authority of Plato from his pagan adversaries, show-
ing that the text of the dialogues coincides more with the doctrines of the Christians. 
In Book VI of De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum (VI.27.211.18 ff.), after citing 
passages from Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias about the eternity of the world, 
Filozofia 75, 3  239 
 
he seeks to show that Plato construes “generated” in the sense of “generated in time”, 
rejecting Aristotle’s incompatible thesis (Segonds 1992, 478).  
In the eighteen books of his treatise De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, Phi-
loponus attacks the eighteen arguments that Proclus, in his On the Eternity of the 
World (De aeterniate mundi), uses to argue in favour of the eternity of the world and 
its incorruptibility.3 To undertake this refutation and establish that the world had a be-
ginning, he especially relies on a literal interpretation of Plato, who would advocate 
a temporal genesis of the world. Similarly, to support his refutative hermeneutics 
against Proclus, he also turns to Aristotle,4 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Plutarch of 
Chaeronea, Atticus, Taurus, Ptolemy, Galen, Plotinus and Porphyry, in order to estab-
lish that the world had a beginning. 
But Proclus’s objections are not directed so much at Christians as at Middle Pla-
tonist philosophers who championed a literal interpretation of Plato.5 For his answers, 
in many passages, as Share (2005a, 1-6) points out, Philoponus adopts a clearly Chris-
tian point of view, and not just purely philosophical, referring to Scripture and the 
Fathers of the Church.  
In Book VI, starting from chapter six (134.21 ff.), he seeks to definitively estab-
lish Plato’s true theory about the eternity of the world and to refute pagan interpreters 
to remove Plato’s authority from them. 
In the first place, Philoponus comments on several Plato passages that address 
the theme of the generation of the world (chap. 7 – 8, 135.21 – 144.15), before going on 
to examine the Platonic commentators Taurus, Porphyry and Proclus (chap. 9 – 23, 
144.16 – 195.6), concluding that the solutions they propose are unacceptable, contradic-
tory and based on an a priori thesis; finally, Philoponus exposes the authors who, ac-
cording to his exegesis, teach Plato’s true thesis: Plutarch, Atticus and Aristotle, whose 
passages he quotes accompanied by the comments dedicated to him by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias (chap. 28 – 29, 211.6 – 242.22). 
But Philoponus does not directly quote Timaeus, as demonstrated by Segonds 
(1992, 466, who compares Tim. 35a – 36d with Philoponus’s text De aeternitate 
 
3 Edition of the Greek text that preserves argument 2 – 18 of Proclus’ On the Eternity of the World 
against the Christians; argument 1 is only preserved in an Arabic translation (Rabe 1899 [1963]); 
German translation of the 18 arguments – argument 1 is translated by  Heine – quoted in Philoponus’ 
De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, short notes and several emendations of Rabe’s edition Baltes 
(1978, 134 – 164); English translation of the fragments from Philoponus’ De aeternitate mundi con-
tra Proclum, with commentary (Lang – Macro – McGinnis, 2001); English translation of the text of 
Philoponus that preserves Proclus’ 18 arguments (argument 1 is translated by Adamson): Share 
(2005a, 2005b, 2010) and Wilberding (2006). 
4 See Gleede (2009). 
5 We do not have sufficient elements to allow us to postulate that the recipients of Proclus’s treatise 
were Christians, as established, without sound arguments, by Rosán (1949). Plutarch of Chaeronea 
and Atticus were the most likely recipients of his criticisms, following the refutation he had under-
taken in his commentary on Timaeus. As regards our topic, the world was not born in time (Proclus, 
In Tim. I.381.26 – 383.12), according to the interpretation of Porphyry and Iamblichus (In Tim. 
I.382.12 – 383.22). See Mueller-Jourdan (2011, 55). 
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mundi 196.25 – 197.15), but indirectly, through intermediate source(s), which include 
citations and summaries of passages from Plato’s physical discourse. 
Who are these intermediary commentators? “For those who are interested, a more 
detailed examination of these matters may be found in the earlier commentators (παρὰ 
τῶν προϋπομνηματισαμένων) we mentioned above (πρόσθεν ἐμνήσθημεν)” (198.4 – 5; 
trans. Share 2005b, 60). These “earlier commentators” (οἱ προϋπομνηματισάμενοι) to 
whom Philoponus refers in order to carry out a more detailed examination are identi-
fied in a previous passage: “For some of the earlier commentators on Plato, including 
the Platonist Taurus and Porphyry the Phoenician, whom Proclus too has followed, 
agree that Plato says that the world is generated (γενητὸν), but not generated in the 
sense that it had a beginning to its being (ὡς ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς τοῦ εἶναι ἀρξάμενον) 
but in accordance with another kind of generation (ἀλλὰ καθ’ἕτερον τρόπον 
γενέσεως); for they say that ‘generated’ has a number of meanings (πολλαχῶς)” 
(145.1 – 8, trans. Share 2005b, 28). 
To counter the adversaries of the temporal creation of the world, Philoponus uses 
Taurus’s Commentary on Timaeus, or Porphyry’s, or both, and could even have 
quoted an excerpt from one of these two authors whose work has not reached us. 
That said, how do the Neoplatonic exegetes read Aristotle? Philoponus accepts 
an exegetical subterfuge designed by some Neoplatonists: If Aristotle attacks Plato, it 
is only apparently; in fact, he does so to attract the attention of the restless and dy-
namic reader, and show him that Plato’s text encapsulates a profound sense different 
to the apparent sense. 
Philoponus experiences what Verryckehn (1991, 213) describes as “total palino-
de”; but this profound and radical change could be related to the adoption of a mani-
festly Christian point of view. Verryckehn differentiates two Philoponus, one who 
remained faithful to the Neoplatonic teaching conveyed by Ammonius in the Alexan-
drian school, and for whom defending pagan philosophy and being a Christian were 
not mutually exclusive; and the other, a defender of Christianity at all costs, who sup-
ported the theses opposed to the first, among which is the eternity of the world, con-
trary to Christian teaching. After 529, Christian Neoplatonists had to suffer pressures 
and threats that would have forced them to renounce the teachings received from pa-
ganism. After his conversion to Christianity, Philoponus gradually renounced Platonic 
theses, in particular, the thesis of the “generation” of the world, key to a literal reading 
of Timaeus. The “total palinode” is exegetical, but he continues to use his own com-
ments on the drafting of his treatises against the adversaries of the temporal creation 
of the world (De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum 199.22 – 200.3). 
II.  
For Proclus, Timaeus’s discourse is a “scientific account” concerning the universe 
“which are brought forth externally for the purposes of instruction (διδασκαλίας ἕνεκα) 
and social intercourse” (In Tim. I.218.19 – 20). It is, therefore, a διδασκαλικὸς λόγος 
that exposes the birth of the world “scientifically and didactically” (I.218.26 – 27). 
Proclus interprets the proposition “the world has been generated” as true, while 
revealing and communicating the true nature of the world, namely, that it is sensible 
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and that it possesses its essence in time (In Tim. I.227.4 – 240.12 [ad 27d6 – 28a1]). 
In so doing, Proclus’s “literal” exegesis of Timaeus opposes the “geometric” (non-
literal) interpretation advocated by members of the Old Academy, especially by Xe-
nocrates. For Alcinous, the Middle Platonist philosopher of the second century AD, 
the birth of the world in Plato is an image, meaning that Timaeus’s discourse is figu-
rative and should not be interpreted literally.6 
The influence of Iamblichus was probably crucial to the abandonment of the “geo-
metric” interpretation by the Neoplatonic school. 
 “An alternative is that he supposed (ὑπέθετο) that the universe is generated 
(γιγνόμενον) ‘for the sake of clarity of instruction (σαφηνείας ἕνεκα διδασκαλικῆς)’,7 
in order to teach how great the benefits are that it has received from the providence 
of the creator. This view is true as far as it goes, but it is not sufficient to do justice 
to Plato’s theory. For, as Iamblichus says,8 clarity is a valuable thing (σαφὲς τίμιόν 
ἐστι), [but only] when it is appropriate for knowledge (ὅταν οἰκεῖον ᾖ πρὸς 
ἐπιστήμην), since, even in the case when the universe is said to be everlasting 
(ἀιδίου), it would still be possible to show that the goods it possesses are given by 
the gods” (In Tim. I.290.9 – 16 [ad. 28b8 – c2]; trans. Runia – Share 2008, 143).9 
Proclus, therefore, reinterprets the formulation of the statute of the discourse as 
διδασκαλικὸς λόγος, remaining true to the literal exegetical proposal that Iamblichus 
probably inaugurated to overcome the non-literal “geometric” interpretation. The scien-
tific nature of the physical discourse is mainly due to the mathematician Timaeus, 
who remained faithful to the Pythagorean way of expression, undertaking the secure 
and “only way of science” (In Tim. I.223.5 – 15 [ad 27d5]).10 
The Diadochus considered that the two “preliminary” sections of the physical 
treatise itself, corresponding to Timaeus (27d6 – 28b5 and 28b5 – 29d5), sought to 
establish the existence of the first causes of the world in order to thus provide the 
condition of possibility of a treatise of the demiurge.11 
 
6 See Alcinous, Didascalicus 32.32 – 35 (Whittaker – Louis 1990, 32). 
7 See Aristotle, De Caelo, I.10.280a1 – 2: “for didactic reasons (διδασκαλίας χάριν) facilitating un-
derstanding by exhibiting the object, like the figure, as in course of formation.” See also Simplicius’ 
comments on the Aristotelian passage (In Cael. 334.4). 
8 Iamblichus, Fr. 33 Dillon. 
9 See Baltes (1978, 51). 
10 See Lernould (2000, 67 – 68). 
11 In In Tim. I.276.10 – 30, Proclus distinguishes two sections (“Hypotheses” and “Demonstra-
tions”), which precede the treatise of the demiurge itself. See (Lernould 2000, 68, n. 16). According 
to the second, third and fourth general “hypotheses”, which precede the treatise of the demiurgy 
itself: (1.b) “That which is ‘become’ is understood by the opinion accompanied by the irrational 
feeling” (Tim. 27d6 – 28a1 – 4). (2.a) “Everything that is ‘become’ ‘becomes’ from a cause”. (2.b) 
“That which exists not from a cause is not ‘become’” (28a4 – 6). Proclus assigns as the objective of 
the first two “hypotheses” – the definitions of that which is “eternal” and that which “becomes” 
(27d6 – 28a1 – 4) the discovery of the “generated” nature of the World (In Tim. I.235.32 ff.) –; as 
the objective of the following two (“Everything that is ‘become’ ‘becomes’ from a cause”). (2.b) 
“That which exists not from a cause is not ‘become’”, the discovery of the Efficient Cause (In Tim. 
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The first “demonstration” covers three lemma: 28b5, 28b6 – 8, and 28b8 – c2. In 
the context of this first “demonstration” (In Tim. I.275.3 – 296.12), Proclus establishes 
the thesis that the world is both “become and eternal” (γενητὸν καὶ ὄν),12 that is to 
say, “become” according to essence and “eternal” according to time. 
According to Proclus, Plotinus, on the one hand, and, subsequently, Porphyry 
and Iamblichus, share with Crantor the assignment to “generated” (γενητόν) of a sense 
that does not refer to time, but only to the dependence of a cause. 
 “Crantor and his circle of exegetes of Plato, however, say that the cosmos is said 
to be generated (γενητὸν) because it is brought into existence from another cause 
(ἀπ’ αἰτίας ἄλλης) and is not self-generated (αὐτόγονον) and self-subsistent 
(αὐθυπόστατον). But Plotinus and the philosophers after him, Porphyry and 
Iamblichus,13 say that it is being composite (σύνθετόν) which in this context has 
been called generated and that the fact that it has been generated (ἀπογεννᾶσθαι) 
from another cause is coexistent (συνυπάρχειν) with this” (In Tim. I.277.8 – 14; 
trans. Runia and Share 2008, 127).14 
 
Proclus attributes to Plotinus and his successors the thesis that “generated” 
equates at the same time to “composed being” and “generated being from a cause 
different to itself”. Plotinus’s innovation lies in adding to γενητόν the composed be-
ing, that is to say, in establishing an association between generation and composition. 
III. 
In Treatise 3 (III.1, On Destiny), one of the first drafted, Plotinus affirms that every-
thing that is produced in the things that become (γιγνόμενα), but also in those that 
always are (ἀεὶ ὄντα) – the three main hypostases15 – which do not always exercise 
the same activity – human souls16 – originates by virtue of some cause (κατ’ αἰτίας) 
and the uncaused (ἀναίτιον) must not be admitted.17 In this way, Plotinus applies the 
principle of causality both to beings who always are and to those who become. 
For Plotinus, intelligible forms are both “generated” (γενητά) and “ungenerated” 
(ἀγένητα):  While they have a principle (ἀρχή), they are generated; but, since this 
principle is not a temporal beginning, but “that they are forever” (ὄντα ἀεί), they are 
 
I.258.12 ff., ad 28a4 – 6); of the other two, the discovery of the Model; and, finally, with the 
name of the World, the discovery of the Final Cause (In Tim. I.272.10 ff. [ad. 28b3 – 5]; see In 
Tim. I.226.22 ff.). 
12 Proclus, In Tim. I.276.27 (ad. 28b6 – 8); 292.15 (ad. 28b8 – c2). See Lernould (2000, 69 – 70). 
13 Iamblichus, Fr. 32 Dillon. 
14 The Greek word συνυπάρχειν (coexistent) can mean either (a) “connected” or (b) “present as 
a subordinate”. See Philips (1997, 180). 
15 See Plotinus, Treatise 3 (III.1) 1.8.  Those that “always are” are the three primary levels of reality, 
i.e. the three main hypostases – the One, the Intelligence, and the Soul – (10 [V.1]). The One, the 
Intelligence, and the Soul are indissoluble and indestructible. 
16 See, e.g., Plotinus, Treatise 7 (V.4) 15 and 17. 
17 See Plotinus, Treatise 3 (III.1) 1.13 – 16. 
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also ungenerated (12 [II.4] 5.25 – 28).18 Therefore, intelligible forms are generated, 
but did not originate at a particular moment (33 [II.9] 3.12 – 13), as in Gnosticism, as 
a result of a mishap in the Pleroma, but are eternally dependent on something else (ἀεὶ 
παρ’ ἄλλου) (12 [II.4] 5.26 – 27).  
 “Things that are said to have come into being did not just come into being [at a par-
ticular moment] (oὐ τοίνυν ἐγένετο) but always were and always will be in process 
of becoming (ἀλλ’ ἐγίνετο καὶ γενήσεται, ὅσα γενητὰ λέγεται): nor will anything 
be dissolved (οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται) except those things which have something to be 
dissolved into that which has nothing into which it can be dissolved will not perish 
(οὐδὲ φθαρήσεται)” (Treatise 33 [II.9] 3.12 – 15; trans. Armstrong 1966, 235). 
Plotinus conceptually distinguishes between (1) ontological or causal dependence, 
which causes intelligible forms to be generated by coming from another higher level 
of reality, and (2) the generation of becoming, which also means corruption. The sen-
sible world is eternal in the sense of no beginning or end, but perpetually becoming 
(12 [II.4] 5.27; 45 [III.7] 6.38 – 42). 
In Plotinus, we can also distinguish two meanings of the term “ungenerated” 
(ἀγένητον): (1) “Not generated” because it lacks a beginning in time, and (2) “not gen-
erated” because it is independent of a previous principle from which it comes.19 The 
first meaning is not the same as the second. Thus, the matter of the intelligible is not 
generated in the first meaning, since it has no beginning in time; however, it is generated 
in the second meaning, since it has a principle, the “first principle” and “otherness”.20 
But what happens if we apply this distinction between the two meanings of “un-
generated” for the matter of the intelligible world to the matter of the sensible world? 
The result is the same, because the matter of the sensible world is not generated in 
time, but has a principle from which it comes, the lower level of the soul (or φύσις), 
hence it is also generated. Although Plotinus does not expressly refer to the matter of 
the sensible world, we can apply the distinction between the two meanings of the term 
“ungenerated”; and thus, both the matter of the sensible world and the matter of the 
intelligible world are generated (γενητά), because they have a principle from which 
they come, and “ungenerated” (ἀγένητα), since they do not have a beginning in time. 
The relationship of matter with time, however, is different in the intelligible and the 
sensible world. Thus, if we continue to read the text quoted above, Plotinus distin-
guishes the sensible world, which becomes “forever”, from the intelligible world, 
which exists “forever”, since otherness, the constitutive principle of intelligible mat-
ter, also exists “forever”21. 
 
18 See Narcy (2005, 425 – 426). 
19 On these two senses of “ungenerated”, see O’Brien (1991, 37). 
20 See Plotinus, Treatise 12 (II.4) 5.24 – 26. 
21 Plotinus, Treatise 12 (II.4] 5.25 – 28: “intelligible realities are originated (γενητὰ) in so far as they 
have a beginning (ἀρχὴν), but unoriginated (ἀγένητα) because they have not a beginning in time (μὴ 
χρόνῳ); they always proceed from something else (ἀεὶ παρ’ ἄλλου), not as always coming into being 
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In the second book of Treatise 23 (VI.5, On the Presence of Being, One and the 
Same, Everywhere as a Whole), Plotinus takes up the distinction drawn in Timaeus 
(27d6 – 28a1) between “that which always is and has no becoming” and “that which 
is always becoming but never is” to interpret the doctrine of the participation of the 
sensible in intelligible forms, which constitutes the backdrop to the thesis of omni-
presence and omniabsence of the intelligible being.22 Plotinus connects “that which 
always is” (Tim. 28a4) with the immutability of the Sophist (248a12). Since the intel-
ligible being is immutable, it is “always with itself” (23 [VI.5] 3.1 – 5), that is to say, 
it does not experience the suffering characterised by “being in another”, “being owned 
by another” (23 [VI.5] 3.5 – 12). Therefore, the intelligible being is “nowhere”, since 
it needs neither a place nor a substrate to be in; and, similarly, is “everywhere”, since 
particular things participate in it, since it is present in each one of them.23  
 
IV. 
In Sentence 14, Porphyry contrasts bodies with the incorporeal, wondering in what sense 
it can be said that they are “generated”, since everything that is generated is generated 
from another (Sent. 13). For bodies, “generated” (γενητόν) means to exist as a result 
of a composition; for incorporeal beings, on the other hand, “generated” means to de-
pend on a cause. In this way, generation, understood to mean composition, is insepa-
rable from death, understood to mean dissolution. However, nothing similar can hap-
pen in the case of incorporeal beings, which are neither born nor destroyed, that is to 
say, in the same way that they have not been generated temporarily, they cannot ex-
perience dissolution either. Thus, the soul, the intermediary between the sensible and 
the intelligible, can ascend, but it can also descend. If it descends, then it divides and 
its power decreases; if it rises, it is unified and its power increases (Sent. 11). 
 “Everything generated owes the cause of its generation to something else (πᾶν 
γενητὸν ἀπ’ ἄλλου τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς γενέσεως ἔχει) – if it is the cause, that is, that 
nothing is generated without a cause (ἀναιτίως). But of things generated, such as 
have gained their existence through composition (διὰ συνθέσεως) would be subject 
to dissolution (λυτὰ), and thus to destruction (φθαρτά); those, on the other hand, 
which, being simple and incomposite (ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀσύνθετα), have gained their 
existence while maintaining simplicity of subsistence, as they are indissoluble 
(ἄλυτα), are indestructible (ἄφθαρτα), but yet are said to be generated (γενητὰ), not 
through being composite (σύνθετα), but through their being dependent on some 
causal principle (ἀπ’ αἰτίου τινὸς)” (Sent. 14.1 – 7; trans. Dillon 2005, 798). 
Thus, Porphyry defends the most radical point of view of the first Neoplatonists 
as regards the interpretation of the axiom of causation. For the philosopher of Tyre, 
 
(γινόμενα ἀεί), like the universe, but as always existing (ὄντα ἀεί), like the universe There (ὁ ἐκεῖ 
κόσμος)” (Trans. Armstrong 1966, 115 – 116). 
22 See Plotinus, Treatise 23 (VI.5) 2.9 – 19; Porphyry, Sentences 38.9 – 10. 
23 See, for example, Proclus, The Elements of Theology, propositions 98, 86, 88, 108, 112, 122. For 
a commentary on prop. 112 and 122, see Dodds (1963, 257 ff. and 264 ff.). 
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“generated” meant two things: (1) to depend on a cause and (2) to exist by virtue of 
a composition (Sent. 14.6 – 9). The first meaning corresponds to simple realities, in-
telligence and soul (14.9 – 10); to bodies, however, both meanings of the term corre-
spond. That said, these two meanings are interconnected in two different ways: (1) 
from the point of view of extent, the first includes the second; but (2) from the point 
of view of comprehension, both meanings are juxtaposed, side by side.24 The concept 
of composition requires that of causality, since every composite presupposes the cause 
that brings together the components.25 Generate by composition is then equivalent to 
a kind of causality. 
How does Porphyry explain, from the point of view of comprehension, this jux-
taposition between causality and composition? To attempt to answer this question, it 
is necessary to turn to the distinction that Plato draws in Timaeus (28b5 – c2). Alt-
hough the interpretation of this passage seeks to establish the compatibility between 
being generated and incorruptible, in Sentence 14, this compatibility is only valid with 
respect to the first meaning of “generated”. 
The hermeneutical key of certain Platonists focuses on preserving the exegesis 
of this passage of Timaeus from criticism directed at it by Aristotle. In his treatise On 
the Heavens (I.10.280a28 – 32),26 the Stagirite affirms that it is impossible to defend, 
as Plato proposes in Timaeus, that the world is generated and incorruptible. If it is said 
to be generated, it must be maintained that it is also corruptible.27 Consequently, and 
faced with this Aristotelian objection, a number of the members of the Platonic school 
sought to demonstrate that the assertion of the generation of the world does not signify 
 
24 The adverb διχῶς, “in two ways”, indicates this juxtaposition: the two meanings are on the same 
plane: τὰ μὲν οὖν σώματα διχῶς γενητὰ (Porphyry, Sent. 14.7 – 8). 
25 See Proclus, In Tim. I.280.2 – ;4. 
26 See also Aristotle, De Caelo, I.10.279b26 – 33, and I.12.282b4. 
27 In De Caelo (I.10.279b4 – 280a35), Aristotle discusses “physical” foundations against those who 
argued that the world has a beginning but not an end. The main objective is clearly focused on the 
cosmology of Timaeus understood literally. In chapter 12 of Book I of De Caelo, Aristotle states 
that, contrary to Plato’s thesis in Timaeus, a generated being is obligatorily corruptible, and, con-
versely, an ingenerated being is necessarily incorruptible. See Longo (1962, 312); see Federspiel 
(2017, 287, 312); see also Broadie (2009, esp. 29 – 33, 39 – 42). For Simplicius: “The argument 
seems to be directed mainly against Xenocrates and the Platonists (δοκεῖ μὲν πρὸς Ξενοκράτην 
μάλιστα καὶ τοὺς Πλατωνικοὺς ὁ λόγος τείνειν)” (In De Caelo, 7.303.33 – 34 Heiberg). William 
Moerbeke, in his Latin translation of Simplicius, On Aristotle On the Heavens: “Videtur quidem 
adversus Xenocratem maxime et adversus Platonicos sermo tendere, quia ex inordinato et fluctuoso 
genitum esse mundum aiun” (424.82 – 83 Bossier). On Xenocrates, see Fr. 54 Heinze (1892), and 
Fr. 73 – 78 Isnardi Parente (2012, 375 ff). On Aristotle’s interpretation of the problem, see Plutarch, 
De animae procreatione in Platonis Timaeo 1013A-F; see Cherniss (1944, 421 ff., and 1976, 170); 
see also Claghorn (1954, 95 ff.). On Theophrastus’ interpretation, see Fr. 241A: “Theophrastus how-
ever, in On the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers, says that the universe has an origin (γενητὸν) 
according to Plato, and makes his objections accordingly. But he (also) suggests that perhaps (Plato) 
adopts the hypothesis that it has an origin for the sake of clear exposition (σαφηνείας χάριν γενητὸν)” 
(trans. Fortenbaugh – Huby – Sharples – Gutas 1992, 430 – 431; see also Fr. 241B). 
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its corruptibility.28 Indeed, to achieve their objective, the Platonists proposed a new 
meaning for “generated”, different to having a beginning in time.29 
In Sentence 14, Porphyry interconnects the two meanings of “generated” intro-
duced by members of the Platonic school: according to Proclus, Crantor provides the 
first meaning of “generated”,30 which appears in Sentence 14, and, in the second cen-
tury AD, Taurus, as John Philoponus conveys in his treatise against Proclus,31 incor-
porates a new meaning close to the second meaning. For Taurus, the world is genera-
ted in the sense that it is possible to conceive it as composed of certain elements. 
According to this, from the interpretation of Taurus, the composition is not real, but 
rather corresponds to a way of conceiving the world as generated, that is to say, as 
a composite of qualities and from a first substrate.  
The fragments of his Commentary on Timaeus preserved by Philoponus show that 
Taurus stood on the side of the Platonists who argued that the world was ungenerated 
and incorruptible.32 In opposition to Atticus and Plutarch, he does not interpret the 
passage from Timaeus (28b7) literally: the world was not manufactured at a particular 
time. It is necessary to overcome the surface level of the letter and not interpret the 
terms “generated” (γενητόν) and “starting-point” (ἀρχή) temporally.  
In light of Taurus’s proposal, Porphyry addresses the following question in Sen-
tence 14: If the composition were real, would the decomposition of the world be pos-
sible? As we know again thanks to Philoponus (De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum 
148.9 – 15; 154.23 – 26), Porphyry, in his commentary on Timaeus, considers the 
second definition as the most appropriate: “generated” is that which is conceived as 
composed specifically of matter and form. However, Philoponus’s treatise does not 
convey Porphyry’s interpretation of the first meaning of “generated” introduced by 
Crantor, nor in what way these two meanings interconnect. We have to turn to Proclus 
(In Tim. I.277.10 – 14) again to discover that Plotinus, Porphyry and Iamblichus in-
novated with respect to Crantor’s thesis by defending the second meaning. But these 
first Neoplatonists would also admit that the composed is also characterised by de-
pendence on a cause (In Tim. I.277.10 – 14). Consequently, for these three Neopla-
tonists, the second meaning signifies the first. 
 
28 Porphyry, in the context of a similar argument, also immediately addresses the Aristotelian 
objection (In Tim. II, Fr. 51.103 – 111 Sodano = Proclus, In Tim. I.395.1 – 10). See Gleede (2009, 
286 – 287). 
29 See Proclus, In Tim. I.279.30 – 32; see also 276.30 – 277.3. See Festugière (1967, 122). 
30 Proclus, In Tim. I.277.8 – 10. See supra, n. 14. 
31 See John Philoponus, De aeternitate mundo contra Proclum 146.13 – 20: “Also described as 
‘generated’ (γενητὸν) are things that are notionally composite (σύνθετον), even if they have not 
[actually] been put together. In this sense the middle note [of the scale] is composed of the highest 
and the lowest (ἡ μέση ἐκ νήτης καὶ ὑπάτης); even though it has not [actually] been put together 
[from them], we detect in it the value that they have relative to each other. And the same applies to 
flowers and animals. In the case of the world, composition and blending (σύνθεσις καὶ κρᾶσις) can 
be seen to the extent that we can reduce it to the first substratum [sc. prime matter] (εἰς τὸ πρῶτον 
ὑποκείμενον) by removing and separating off its qualities” (Trans. Share 2005b, 29). 
32 On the interpretation of Taurus’ Timaeus 28b7, see Baltes (1976, 105 – 121), Verrycken (1997, 
283 – 317), Kühn (2005, 423 – 424), see also Karamanolis (2006, 179 – 184). 
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That said, it would seem that in Sentence 14 Porphyry points out that there are 
two different meanings of “generated”, while in Proclus the second meaning signi-
fies the first, which it should replace. However, the explanation rests on the same 
basis: these are two meanings that in the history of the interpretation of Timaeus 




In Timaeus, Plato sets out the axiom of causality after the exposition of an ontology 
in which he opposes being and becoming, between “that which always is and has no 
becoming” and “that which is always becoming but never is”. Generation and destruc-
tion are inseparable notions: that which is generated is susceptible to destruction, and 
that which is susceptible to destruction is generated. So Plato alludes to the eventuality 
of the destruction of the universe, which is generated, although later rejected (Tim. 
38b). The changes that come with the notion of becoming – generation and corruption 
– precisely require that there be a principle of causality: such as that which becomes, 
since it is generated and destroyed, but never truly is.  
Plotinus does not extend the principle of causality beyond the sensible.33 He does 
not depart much, therefore, from the Platonic proposal in Timaeus: where Plato makes 
a distinction between becoming, which needs a cause, and being, which, as it is im-
mutable, “is ceaseless”, and has no cause. However, in Plotinus, the distinction be-
tween ontological dependence – through which intelligible forms are generated – and 
becoming is not as clearly settled as in Porphyry. 
Porphyry’s interpretation in Sentence 14 modifies the Platonic principle of cau-
sality, as it appears in Timaeus (28a), where that which becomes, while not truly, is 
the object of opinion and is not intelligible. By contrast, the statement of the principle 
of causality in Porphyry does not come after the ontological exposition, as in Plato, 
but rather precedes it. Thus, the field of the “generated” (γενητόν) extends beyond the 
sensible in such a way that it applies the principle of causality to the field of the su-
persensible, beyond becoming (i.e., the Soul and the Intelligence, generated from and 
by the One). 
Instead of opposing being and becoming, like Plato, Porphyry introduces a distinc-
tion in the field of the “generated” in such a way that it can no longer coincide with 
either the sensible or becoming. Even assuming that everything that is composed, and 
therefore also susceptible to decomposition, is exposed to destruction, some beings are 
“generated” (γενητά) not because they integrate the cycle of that which is generated and 
that which is susceptible to destruction, but just because they depend on a cause.  
In this way, Porphyry expands causality to the being and the intelligible. For 
Porphyry, the Platonic axiom of causality: everything that generates (= generated) 
necessarily generates due to a cause34 is only valid if the meaning of “generated” 
 
33 See Plotinus, Treatise 3 (III.1) 1.12 – 15. 
34  See Plato, Tim. 28c2 – 3: “Further, we maintain that, necessarily, that which comes to be must 
come to be by the agency of some cause (τῷ δ’ αὖ γενομένῳ φαμὲν ὑπ’ αἰτίου τινὸς ἀνάγκην εἶναι 
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(γενητόν) is applied to non-composed, and therefore incorporeal, realities. In the Neo-
platonic distinction, these realities, being indestructible (Sent. 14.6), are not in the 
range of “that which is always generated and never is”, but of “that which always is 
and is not generated”, that is to say, of “that which is without ceasing to be”. This im-
balance with respect to the literal meaning of Timaeus is compatible with the henologi-
cal-processional architecture of Neoplatonism, where ontological dependence con-
cerns everything that is inferior to the One-Good and, therefore, prior to the generation 
of the sensible: hypostasis and beings, different and prior to becoming. 
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